NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

CHOOSING TO WIN: HOW SOF CAN BETTER SELECT PARTNERS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING

by

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June 2014

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	**2. REPORT DATE** June 2014	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** Master's Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
CHOOSING TO WIN: HOW SOF CAN BETTER SELECT PARTNERS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S) William R. Hermann III

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943–5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The U.S. government relies heavily on security cooperation and security assistance programs to build partner-nation capacity as a means of furthering U.S. national security interests. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have contributed to this effort, particularly in the training and advising of foreign forces. However, the overall alignment of these efforts can sometimes be problematic. Furthermore, in a fiscally austere environment, planners will be forced to make difficult decisions about which countries will yield the best results when SOF are employed to build capacity.

This thesis uses two RAND reports—*What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity* and *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool*, published in 2014, to assess which factors are most critical for SOF efforts to build partnership capacity. It then relates these factors to countries where SOF training and advising might be employed. It finds that the countries best suited to SOF training and advising are the ones that the RAND reports suggest are the least likely to build capacity. Given this insight, this thesis recommends that Theater Special Operations Commands continue to explore new and creative solutions for security cooperation programs while working with interagency actors and industry to build partnership capacity.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Security Force Assistance, Building Partner Capacity, Special Operations			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 85
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UU

NSN 7540–01–280–5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18

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CHOOSING TO WIN: HOW SOF CAN BETTER SELECT PARTNERS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BPC	building partner capacity
CCMD	Combatant Command
CF	conventional forces
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
DATT	Defense Attaché
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
FID	foreign internal defense
FSF	foreign security forces
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GEF	Guidance for the Employment of the Force
GFIM	Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
HN	host nation
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PN	partner nation
QDR	quadrennial defense review
SA	security assistance
SC	security cooperation
SCO	security cooperation organization
SDO	senior defense official
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SF	special forces
SFA	security force assistance
SOF	special operation forces
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the staff, faculty, and students of the Defense Analysis Department for a brilliant experience and first-class education. I'd especially like to thank Professor Heather Gregg for her mentorship and encouragement; without her help, this thesis would not have been possible. Thanks also go to Professor George Lober for his guidance and patience; and to my wife and family for enduring the many hours I spent in the library.

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I. SOF AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY IN A RESOURCE CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

A. BACKGROUND

In 2012, influenced by recent fiscal constraints and over a decade of war, President Barak Obama set the course for a new national security strategy that altered the means by which the United States protects American interests while sustaining its leadership role in the world. President Obama's 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance claims, "The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate."[1] This concern has prompted policymakers to look for new and more cost-effective ways to ensure national security.

One of the means of addressing these national security objectives is through partnerships with foreign nations. In the 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 23: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*,* the President set four goals for U.S. Security Sector Assistance: 1) Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges; 2) Promote partner support for U.S. interests; 3) Promote universal values, such as good governance; and 4) Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations.[2] These goals were echoed in the president's 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance*;* both documents highlight the importance of the U.S. military's role in "providing a stabilizing presence" in order to strengthen security relationships through building partner capacity.[3]

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[1] Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 8.

[2] White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy," 5 April 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy.

[3] White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 41.

The Department of Defense, through United States Code Title 10 authorities, is one of the many instruments used to build partner capacity, particularly military and security forces through security cooperation missions. However, as the lead agency for foreign affairs, the Department of State is the executive agent for security assistance programs.[4] It does this through "a group of programs, authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961… by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."[5]

The diverse responsibilities between multiple agencies, authorizations, appropriations, and responsibilities makes building partnership capacity difficult to execute and measure. The 2013 and 2014 Budget Control Acts and sequestration cuts further complicate these divisions, likely leading to greater interagency and interdepartmental competition for resources and funding.[6] Additionally, each partner nation and region has its own unique set of varying circumstances that may not always align with U.S. policy objectives. All of these factors make building partnership capacity challenging. However, as the U. S. military moves from large-scale wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to limited engagements and security force assistance, how to build partnership capacity and match it to U.S. security interests deserves greater attention.

B. THESIS QUESTION AND METHODS

This thesis aims to assist USSOCOM and Theater Special Operation Command planners in developing theater support campaign plans to build partner capacity. This thesis will use two research reports, *What Works Best*

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[4] Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance*, Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 (Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), ix.

[5] Ibid., vii.

[6] Cheryl Pellerin, "Service Chiefs Detail 2014 Sequestration Effects," American Forces Press Server, 19 September 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120825.

When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?[7] and *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,*[8] along with trends from recent SOF deployments to analyze current SOF efforts in building partner capacity.

Specifically, this thesis will use the tools developed in these reports to test the likelihood of building partnership capacity in the countries in which SOF is either engaged or likely to engage in capacity-building activities. The reports argue that there are nine factors with strong correlation to successful capacity building: four under U.S control (funding, consistency, matching, sustainment), four under the control of the partner nation (funds, absorptive capacity, governance, economy), and one shared by both (security interests). However, the reports also note that national interest may outweigh the need for these preconditions. The reports provide quantitative and qualitative data on each country in the form of a spreadsheet containing analysts ratings of the nine factors that would lead to successful capacity building, this spreadsheet is then compared with recent SOF deployments to determine the most likely countries where SOF has the greatest indicators for successful capacity building.

This thesis finds that most of the nine factors that correlate with successful capacity building are related to national-level policies or factors under the control of the partner nation. These factors can be difficult to change and take time however, the absorptive capacity of the partner nation military is one factor that can be quickly assessed through available quantitative data and confirmed with qualitative assessments by SOF units. When national policy or campaign plans call for capacity building, particularly those involving the training or advising of partner SOF or the use of U.S. SOF to build a capacity, the RAND tool can serve a starting point to build the case for security cooperation mission and the propensity for them to succeed.

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7 Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* RAND Report MG-1253/1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

8 Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,* RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

C. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter II serves as a background and outline on how the United States government's national security strategy is implemented into department level guidance and eventually becomes part of regional and country plans by the Department of Defense and Department of State. This thesis will mainly focus on the Department of Defense and its Security Cooperation programs that involve training by Special Operations Forces but will also include discussion of other agencies as they apply, like the State Department's Security Assistance program.

Chapter III will outline the initial RAND study, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances and the derivative product, The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,* as a quantitative means of developing a framework for assessing current SOF efforts to build partner capacity.

Chapter IV will look at the data from the original RAND report and how the "matching tool" currently rates the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation missions today. This chapter will make observations based on this data as to which countries are currently the most primed for SOF engagement and which countries would be the most challenging and why.

Chapter V will provide conclusions and recommendations for Security Cooperation policies and operations that involve special operations forces and the selection partner nations to build capacity. In particular, this chapter will consider the likelihood of SOF efforts to build partnership capacity given the nine factors from the reports. It will conclude with suggestions for the way ahead.

II. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY COOPERATION

In order to understand the role of security cooperation in U.S. national security strategy, it is important to consider national-level documents and policies that lay the groundwork for all U.S. foreign policy. This chapter begins by outlining key documents that pertain to U.S. national-level security strategies and policies and how they relate to security cooperation efforts. It then outlines the theater processes for developing campaign plans that operationalize the national defense strategy. Finally, the last section outlines the State Department's processes for security assistance in relation to the Defense Department's efforts.

This chapter demonstrates the complex nature of security cooperation planning and execution and emphasizes the many agencies involved in the process. These constraints will then be considered in light of recent SOF efforts to build partnership capacity in several countries.

A. NATIONAL LEVEL

The President of the United States, according to public law as defined in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, has the obligation to "transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States."[9] The Goldwater-Nichols Act specifies that the national security strategy of the United States address the following:

> The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
>
> The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
>
> The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the

[9] See also USC 50 402 and Public Law 99–433 dated OCT 1, 1986.

> United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
>
> The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
>
> Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.[10]

The most current National Security Strategy was published by the Obama administration in May 2010. In a broad overview, the document defines the strategic environment and the administration's strategy to pursue U.S. national interests which it defines as: "security, prosperity, values, and international order."[11] According to this document, the administration views its top security threat as weapons of mass that could be used by violent extremists groups, but also seeks to dismantle terrorists organizations that pose a threat to the U.S. or its allies, and promote security and prosperity which it views as universal values. The administration admits these are tough challenges and cannot be accomplished alone; therefore, it looks to strengthen alliances and build capacity in partner nations who seek similar national security interests.

In support of the National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense publishes the National Defense Strategy periodically; the most recent version was published in January 2012 and titled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense."[12] This document clarifies the defense secretary's priorities and defines the primary missions of the U.S. armed forces while generally outlining how the Department of Defense will meet the demands

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[10] Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, 10 USC 162, 1986.

[11] White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 17.

[12] Barack H. Obama and Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012).

of the National Security Strategy with acceptable risk.[13] The secretary defines ten primary missions that the armed forces will focus on and generally how they should be executed. One of the primary missions, "provide a stabilizing presence," is closely linked to security cooperation efforts and specifically calls for building partner capacity while acknowledging a reduction in resources.[14]

In addition to the National Defense Strategy, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to assist the president and secretary of defense in providing strategic direction for U.S. armed services.[15] The purpose of the document is to define the ways and means in which the military will meet the national security strategy and the defense objectives of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is a report generated every four years that sets a long-term course for the DOD as it assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces, and re-balances the DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats.[16] The most recent version, published by Admiral Mullen in February 2011, advances three main themes,

1. The joint force's leadership is often as important as the military capabilities provided;
2. The changing security environment requires the joint force to deepen security relationships with allies and create opportunities for partnership with new and diverse groups of actors;

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 5.

[15] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *The National Military Strategy of the United States: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), i.

[16] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), I.

3. The joint force must prepare for an increasingly dynamic and uncertain future in which a full spectrum of military capabilities and attributes will be required to prevent and win the nation's wars.[17]

The National Military Strategy further defines the national military objectives as:

- Counter violent extremism
- Deter and defeat aggression
- Strengthen international and regional security
- Shape the future force[18]

Figure 1 demonstrates the links between the national military objectives, outlined by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combination of other national level documents, which are then compiled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense into a single classified document called the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF).

[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *The National Military Strategy of the United States: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), I.

[18] Ibid., 4.



Figure 1. Security Cooperation Guidance Flow, after Moroney et al., 2009, 32.

The GEF helps the DOD consolidate and integrate several separate guidance documents into a single strategic directive.[19] It provides the "what" that helps bridge the connection from strategy to operations; it does this in part by incorporating specific guidance for security cooperation, deliberate planning, global posture, global force management, and nuclear weapons planning.[20] The GEF also directs the combatant commanders to create campaign plans to achieve theater and functional strategic end states; in doing so it provides combatant commands with:

[19] Patrick C. Sweeny, "A Primer for: *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), the *Adaptive Planning and Execution* (APEX) *System*, and *Global Force Management* (GFM)" (Newport, RI: U.S. Navy, 2011), 1.

[20] Ibid.

DOD global prioritized end states as well as theater strategic or functional strategic end states for campaign planning

- Strategic assumptions
- Prioritized deliberate planning scenarios and end states
- Global posture and global force management guidance
- Security Cooperation priorities
- Overarching DOD and U.S. nuclear policy.[21]

Within the GEF, guidance on campaign planning for priorities, countries, and individuals is divided into the following categories: critical partners, key supporting partners, and actors of concern (see Table 1).[22]

[21] Ibid., 2.

[22] Ibid.

Critical Partners: 1. Countries or organizations that are direct recipients of U.S. security cooperation resources 2. Cannot achieve one or more end states without engagement 3. Reflect a deliberately select group of countries or organizations 4. May be current relationships or desired future relationship 5. Partnerships must be pursued during the life of this guidance in the next two years
Key Supporting Partners: 1. Countries or organizations that assist a command in achieving one or more end states 2. May or may not be from the region in question 3. Provides capabilities that compliment or supplement U.S. capabilities
Actors of Concern: 1. Countries or non-state actors who may or may not be potential adversaries 2. Could be from outside the Area of Responsibility 3. Security cooperation and "Phase 0" activities designed to assist with problems or influence behavior, counter negative influence, or set the conditions for operational success 4. Must pose a problem to a region in a direct and immediate way

Table 1. GEF Groupings of Countries / Organizations, from Sweeney 2011, 3.

The GEF typically associates a desired end state within a specific country with how it is categorized; in some cases, a country can be categorized as both a critical partner as well as an actor of concern.

In addition to the GEF, the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on how to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capability.[23]

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on policy, which includes oversight on all security cooperation programs. Security cooperation is defined as:

[23] Ibid., 4.

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.[24]

The USD-P works closely with other U.S. agencies to ensure defense policy and programs related to security cooperation are coordinated.

Under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P), the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the SECDEF on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. "The ASD (SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities."[25]

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is a defense agency within the OUSD-P that is tasked to "lead, resource, and educate the Defense Security Cooperation community to shape, refine, and execute innovative security solutions for partners in support of U.S. interests."[26] The DSCA also works closely with the interagency and serves as the focal point between the DOD and industry for foreign military sales and other security assistance programs.[27] DSCA also manages a number of DOD security cooperation programs such as building partner capacity and humanitarian assistance as well as demining assistance.[28]

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[24] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 235.

[25] Office of the Secretary of Defense, accessed 8 April 2014, http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDPOffices/ASDforSpecialOperationsLowIntensityConflict.aspx.

[26] Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed 8 April 2014, http://www.dsca.mil/about-us/mission.

[27] DISA Security Cooperation Familiarization Course, accessed 1 April 2014, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/PAGES/COURSES/ONLINE/SC_FAM.ASPX?TAB=REG (login required).

[28] Ibid.

B. THEATER LEVEL

The combatant commands (CCMD) are established by the Unified Command Plan (UCP), a classified executive branch document prepared by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reviewed and updated every two years. The UCP assigns geographic areas of responsibility to the CCMDs in addition to planning, training, and operational responsibilities.[29] In the process of developing theater level security cooperation plans, CCMD planners review six main documents: The National Security Strategy; The National Defense Strategy; The National Military Strategy; Strategic Planning Guidance, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance.[30] From this process, CCMDs prepare three main types of plans:

- Campaign plans
- Contingency plans (top-priority and lesser priority)
- Functional plans (usually plans which are common to all combatant commands or commander-directed plans).[31]

There are generally two categories of campaign plans: global or functional campaigns, and theater campaigns. Each of the six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)—North, South, Europe, Pacific, Africa, and Central—develops theater campaign plans while a functional combatant command like the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has a functional responsibility that spans world-wide. For example, USSOCOM is the lead CCMD for synchronizing DOD planning to combat terrorists and their networks on a global basis, but also support the GCC's with Special Operations Forces.[32]

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[29] Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), ii.

[30] Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., *A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security Cooperation*, RAND Report MG-563-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 7.

[31] Plans common to all combatant commands could be Humanitarian/Disaster Response (HA/DR) or Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

[32] Feickert, *Unified Command Plan,* 15.

Once approved, the operational level plans developed at the CCMDs are then generally categorized into Operation Plans (OPLAN) or Concept Plans (CONPLAN). An OPLAN is the most in depth and is defined as "a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data."[33] CONPLANS are less detailed than an OPLAN; JP 1–02 defines CONPLANS as "an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order."[34]

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between an approved OPLAN with an operations order (OPORD) and the planned phases of an operation as defined by JP 5–0: Joint Operational Planning. Significant DOD security cooperation activities and military engagements are routinely conducted worldwide during peacetime "Phase 0" (shaping) through the GCC's theater campaign plans.[35]

[33] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 197.

[34] Ibid., 51.

[35] Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance,* Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 (Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), I-6.



Figure 2. Notional Operation Plan Phases, from *JP 5–0: Joint Operational Planning* 2011, III-39.

As part of the planning process for theater campaign plans, CCMD planners must determine the force requirements necessary for the execution of planned and contingency operations. The *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance* (GFMIG) prepared by the Joint Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense provides the framework for assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces.[36] Figure 3 illustrates the GFMIG process as the Combatant Commands develop force requirements, which are filled by the joint force providers. For example, when Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) develops a theater campaign plan that calls for the use of Special Operations Forces to

[36] Sweeny, *A Primer*, 16.

train, advise, and assist a partner nation military force, the subordinate Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), in this case Special Operations Command-SOUTH, submits a request to the Joint Staff, which then staffs the request with the joint force providers (in this case USSOCOM) to provide the resources to conduct the mission.



Figure 3. Global Force Management Process, from Introduction to Global Force Management 5 April 2014.

C. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

One of the subsets of the Department of Defense's security cooperation mission is Security Force Assistance (SFA), which Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 defines as:

> The set of Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions. FSF are all organizations and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a mission of protecting the HN's sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal defense [FID], counterterrorism, counterinsurgency [COIN], or stability operations).[37]

As a combatant command, USSOCOM views SFA as one of its many missions and it is integrated within one of the command's four major lines of operation, "Expand the global SOF partnership."[38] Joint Publication 3–05 "Special Operations" provides the following guidance on the relationship between the conduct of SFA and USSOCOM:

> USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for SFA, with responsibility to lead the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the SFA capability across DOD. This includes development of SFA joint doctrine; training and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission essential task lists; and identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience. Additionally, in collaboration with the Joint Staff…and in coordination with the Services and GCCs, USSOCOM is tasked with developing global joint sourcing solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces (CF and/or SOF) for a SFA mission.[39]

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[37] Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance,* Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 (Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), I–1.

[38] USSOCOM, *Fact Book 2014,* accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2014.pdf.

[39] Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance,* Joint Doctrine Note 1–13 (Washington, DC: DOD, 29 April 2013), II-12–13.

While USSOCOM is a combatant command, its forces are "normally under operational control of the commander, theater special operations commander, or a commander, special operations component command, who has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of special operations in support of the GCC or a subordinate Joint Force Commander, respectively." [40] Figure 4 provides an illustration of the stakeholders involved in SFA and the complex coordination relationships between the different entities.



Figure 4. Security Forces Assistance Coordination, from JDN 1–13: *Security Force Assistance* 29 April 2013, II-3.

[40] Ibid., I-13.

D. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In contrast to the DOD, which is mainly focused on security, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency within the executive branch and the main institution for the conduct of American diplomacy.[41] The mission of the DOS is to "shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere."[42] The DOS does not follow the same planning process as the DOD, which is required to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review every four years. However, Secretary of State Clinton, while in office, implemented the first *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, which implements foreign policy guidance down to the regional level and is loosely equivalent to the GCC's theater campaign plans.

The DOS's security assistance program sits at the intersection of security and diplomacy. Security assistance is defined as:

> A group of programs…by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.[43]

There are three main offices within the DOS that deal with security assistance: The Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control & International Security Affairs; the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (USAID); and the Ambassadors or Chief, U.S. Diplomatic Mission (COM) for each country. The Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs "leads the interagency policy process on nonproliferation and manages global U.S. security

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[41] Department of State, *Strategic Plan FY14–17* (Washington, DC: DoS, 2014), 6.

[42] Department of State, accessed, 5 April 2014 http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission.

[43] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *JP1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2014), 234.

policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance."[44]

Within the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principle link between DOS and DOD and provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.[45] The Office of Security Assistance directs over $6 billion annually in U.S. military grant assistance to ally countries through policy development, budget formulation, and program oversight.[46]

USAID is the lead U.S. government agency that works to end extreme global poverty and enable resilient, democratic societies to realize their potential.[47] While USAID mainly focuses on economic development, many times these efforts can overlap as part of a whole-of-government approach to development and security sector reform.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs serves as the day-to-day manager of overall regional and bilateral policy issues, and oversees the seven regional bureaus that manage the 270 U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions throughout the world. In each embassy, the Chief of Mission (usually an ambassador appointed by the president) is responsible for executing U.S. foreign policy goals and for coordinating and managing all U.S. government functions in the host country.[48]

Each embassy typically has a Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) who works with the ambassador as the principle DOD official as designated by the SECDEF. DOD Directive 5132.03: "DOD Policy and

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[44] Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/index.htm.

[45] Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/index.htm.

[46] Department of State, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/index.htm.

[47] USAID, accessed 5 April 2014, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do.

[48] Department of State, *Strategic Plan FY14–17*, (Washington, DC: DoS, 2014), 7.

Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation" defines the SDO or DATT as "the principle military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically DOD military officer assigned to the diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD assigned to or working from the embassy."[49]

In addition to the Office of the Defense Attaché, a Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) manages the security cooperation programs in the host country. The SCO, in coordination with the embassy country team, develops country plans that provide the roadmap of specific engagement activities that a GCC intends to conduct from one-to-three years.[50] These activities include day-to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, and combined exercises. The plan provides guidance to service components and other DOD planners, which inform and are informed by both the COM's integrated country strategy and, if applicable, USAID country development strategy. [51]

Figure 5 shows the organization of the U.S. government for security cooperation and security assistance. Of particular note are the points of intersection between the DOS and DOD, and the multiple agencies involved in implementing security assistance.

[49] Department of Defense, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,* Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03 (Washington, DC: DOD, 24 October 2008), 11.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, III-1.



Figure 5. U.S. Government Organization for Security Cooperation and Security Assistance. From *The Management of Security Cooperation* 2013, 3–3.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the policies and agencies responsible for security cooperation and security assistance. Specifically, it demonstrates the complexity of the system and highlights the major agencies from the President to the country team that are involved in planning, resourcing, and executing U.S. foreign policy and the mechanisms used to implement it.

The next chapter outlines a tool developed by the RAND Corporation to assist in selecting partner nations to build partner capacity as part of a security assistance or security cooperation program.

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III. RAND TOOLS FOR ASSESSING BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

Security cooperation across the DOD is a diverse and complex set of programs, the effort of which spans the globe and varies by combatant command; this diversity in geographic region and country creates a particular challenge in developing an analytic tool to compare efforts across the range of partner countries. Ideally planners would be able to measure security cooperation efforts and outcomes across the theater of operations or even globally in order to make policy and operational recommendations; however, no such tools exist.

In 2013, the RAND Corporation conducted a study that asked the question: "How can the DOD increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts?"[52] This chapter will look at the data, evidence, and findings from this report as well as the follow on report, which developed a tool to serve as a preliminary diagnostic assessment of security cooperation efforts to augment the challenges of individual subject matter expert-based assessments.[53] This assessment tool will then be used in Chapter IV to assess SOF efforts at building partnership capacity.

A. WHAT WORKS BEST WHEN BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

1. Data

Due to the sensitivity of the some of the details of the partnerships involved in the case studies the actual partners were not listed, while the case studies in the full controlled-access companion report were reviewed, none of the

[52] Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* RAND Report MG-1253/1-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), xiii.

[53] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,* RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2013), 1–2.

data is included in this thesis. For access to the full case studies including the list of 29 countries selected, contact the RAND Corporation.

The RAND report considers and compares 29 historical case studies of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the Cold War.[54] This research design allows for twenty years of data to be collected under different conditions and contexts.[55] Each country case study is divided into two, three, or four chronological phases, which then act as units of analysis.[56] The report notes that the average length of a phase is eight years.[57] Analysts determined phases by significant shifts and events affecting many factors in an overall case; some examples include a regional war, changes in U.S. priorities, or a crisis inside the partner nation or its government.[58] Once compiled, the total number of phases equals 100; this includes the null phases where no building capacity occurred, the actual data phases, and a baseline phase.[59] Of the 100 phases, 38 are null or baseline, and 62 are "real" phases in which the United States conducted building partner capacity activities with discernable intent.[60] In 55 of those 62 phases, "at least one of the primary objectives was a form of capacity building—that is, relationship building or securing access was not the only primary objective, and efforts included some kind of earnest attempt to build actual capacity."[61] Figure 6 is the RAND Venn diagram of the subsets of the 62 non-null phases.[62]

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54 Ibid., xiv.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 47.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid, xiv–xv.

62 Ibid., xvi.



Figure 6. Venn Diagram of the Subset of Phases in the Data, from Paul et al., 2013, 55.

2. Findings

Building partner capacity (BPC) is complex; however, the report finds that there are clearly some best practices for the conduct of BPC, and useful traits for desirable partners.[63] The analysis from the report produces the following findings:

> 1. Matching matters: BPC is most effective when U.S. objectives align with partner-nation objectives and when BPC efforts align with the partner's baseline capabilities and absorptive capacity.[64]

The cases show that BPC is effective "when the capacity being built meets the interests of both the partner country and the United States and when the BPC activities are a good match for the partner's baseline capacity in the that area

[63] Ibid., xviii

[64] Ibid., xvii.

and its capacity to absorb new materiel, training, and so on."[65] One example of this is Mexico; between 1996–1999 U.S. special forces trained approximately 3,200 personnel in rapid response operations. Additionally, during the same time period, the attendance of Mexican airmen at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy increased from 141 to 331.[66] As a result, around 1998 the U.S. and Mexico began "forming a shared understanding of the severity of the threat in Mexico," which led to more effective partnering on a range of issues, especially counternarcotics.[67]

2. Context matters: Certain characteristics or features of PNs make BPC more likely to be effective.[68]

Specifically, the following properties are associated with greater effectiveness in BPC:

- PN invests its own funds to support or sustain capacity
- PN has sufficient absorptive capacity;
- PN has high governance indicators;
- PN has a strong economy;
- PN shares security interests with the United States.[69]

3. Independent of PN context, there are several factors under the control of the United States that correlate strongly with BPC effectiveness.[70]

These factors include:

- Spending more money on BPC or undertaking more BPC initiatives;

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65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 68.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., xvii.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

- Consistency in both the funding and implementation of these initiatives;
- Matching BPC efforts with PN objectives and absorptive capacity;
- Including a sustainment component in the initiatives.[71]

The results demonstrate that when all three principles are followed, building partnership capacity has been effective. In other words, "if BPC is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the efforts, has a healthy economy and government, prospects for effective BPC are very good."[72] The findings also suggest that "BPC can still be effective when only some of the practices are followed or when only some of the conditions are met."[73] However, the "strongest and most consistent correlations" are for "factors at the seams of U.S. and partner nation control"; that is to say, the factors not specifically under the control of one or the other but rather the factors related to "the alignment of interests and the matching of capacity building activities to partner objectives and to the ability of the partner nation to absorb and retain the materiel and training provided."[74]

3. Recommendations

The study's findings suggest several recommendations for future planning and execution of BPC, and in investing in the creation and maintenance of BPC capabilities.[75]

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., xviii.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

1. Where possible, choose partners that have or can adopt the attributes, characteristics, or behaviors that are associated with effective BPC.[76]

The study acknowledges that certain partners are chosen to meet policy objectives or counter specific threats; however, when there is flexibility in choosing a partner the factors of effective BPC should be considered.[77] Specifically, when all else is equal, give preference to countries that:

- Are willing to invest their own funds to support or sustain capacity;
- Have sufficient absorptive capacity;
- Have governance indicators;
- Have strong and healthy economies;
- Have broad strategic interests predominately align with U.S. interests in the region.[78]

2. Regardless of the partner or context, choose BPC goals and activities to correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what it is capable of absorbing.[79]

3. For continued BPC effectiveness, the United States should build or maintain partner capabilities in the following ways:

Plan BPC activities to match both U.S. and PN needs and objectives;

Identify baseline PN absorptive capacity and match BPC activities to what the partner can absorb;

Build ministerial capacity and develop absorptive capacity in general;

Consider sustainment capabilities.[80]

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., xix.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid, xix–xx.

B. THE RAND SECURITY COOPERATION PRIORITIZATION AND PROPENSITY MATCHING TOOL

Building on the previous RAND study, the "matching tool" is a diagnostic tool built in Microsoft Excel that aims to assist planners during preliminary stages, identify mismatches between the country and U.S. interests, propose U.S. security cooperation funding to that country, and predict the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation with that country.[81]

Traditionally, efforts to evaluate likely benefits relative to priorities for security cooperation have taken place at the country level and have depended almost entirely on individual country subject-matter experts (SMEs).[82] These SME assessments often suffer from shortcomings, including a lack of comparability across countries, an absence of impartiality, and inconsistencies in the level of expertise of the SME.[83]

As a potential solution to these issues, the "matching tool" produces an overall security propensity score for each of the world's 195 countries; these scores can then be compared with U.S security cooperation funding levels and country prioritization.[84]

The "matching tool" builds on the findings of the RAND report, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstance;* it takes nine specific and measurable factors that individually correlate with BPC success and scores them in a binary fashion: 0 = absent, 1 = present.[85]

The first four factors are under U.S. control:

1. Spending more money on BPC or undertaking more BPC initiatives;

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[81] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool,* RAND Report TL-112-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2013), x.

[82] Ibid., 1.

[83] Ibid., 1–2.

[84] Ibid., x–xi.

[85] Ibid., 8.

2. Ensuring consistency in both the funding and implementation of these initiatives;

3. Matching BPC efforts with PN objectives and absorptive capacity;

4. Including a sustainment component in the initiatives[86]

The second four factors are characteristics of the partner or are under PN control:

5. PN invests its own funds;

6. PN has sufficient absorptive capacity;

7. PN has high governance indicators;

8. PN has a strong economy.[87]

One factor is shared between the United States and the PN:

9. PN shares a broad security interests with the United States.[88]

Figure 7 summarizes the 29 case studies in a table and shows the strong correlation between the individual nine factors and BPC success; additionally the sum is also a relatively strong predictor of BPC in the latest phase of the case.[89]

[86] Ibid., x.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid., 8.

Case	Spent/did more	Consistency in funding and providing BPC	BPC matched PN objectives and absorptive capacity	BPC included a sustainment component	PN invested its own funds	PN had sufficient absorptive capacity	PN had high governance indicators (WBGI in top two-thirds)	PN had strong economy (GDP top 50th percentile)	Shared PN and U.S. security interests	Sum of positive indications	BPC in last phase assessed as effective
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	1
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	8	1
7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	8	1
8	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
9	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
10	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
11	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
12	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
13	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
14	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
15	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1
16	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
17	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
18	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	7	1
19	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	1
20	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	6	1
21	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	6	1
22	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	6	1
23	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	6	0
24	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	1
25	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	4	0
26	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0
27	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
28	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
29	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

NOTE: The table is sorted based on the descending sum of positive indicators. WBGI = World Bank Governance Indicator.

Figure 7. Summary of Case Studies, Factors, and BPC Effectiveness, from Paul et al., 2013, 9.

The results from Figure 7 led the researchers to ask two questions that motivated their research effort:

- Which of the rest of the countries in the world have pattern of factors that correspond with success in historical cases?
- Which other factors can be identified in the literature that might contribute to propensity for success?[90]

After reviewing the literature the research team developed approximately 70 hypotheses, which were further refined into 27 constructs.[91] Each associated construct has an associated weight, representing the strength of the contribution of that construct to the propensity for effective security cooperation and the strength of the research contributing to that construct.[92] The 27 constructs were then further grouped into ten categories as shown in Table 2.[93]

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 14.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

CATEGORY 1. HISTORICAL QUALITY OF U.S. SC/SFA/BPC PROVISION SC is more likely to be effective when the U.S. provides an adequate amount of consistent SC funding to the PN
Construct 1.1: U.S. SC/SFA/BPC funding consistent **Construct 1.2:** U.S. SC/SFA/BPC funding sufficient
CATEGORY 2. HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD OF SUCCESS WITH PN SC is more likely to be effective with a PN that has successfully implemented and sustained U.S. or other foreign assistance in the past
Construct 2.1: U.S. historical success with SC/BPA/SFA **Construct 2.2:** Historical success with foreign aid
CATEGORY 3. U.S.-PN RELATIONSHIP SC is more likely to be effective when the U.S. and PN have a long-term relationship built on shared interests and a history of cooperation and where the U.S. is viewed favorably by the PN
Construct 3.1: PN cooperation with U.S. **Construct 3.2:** PN citizen perception of U.S. **Construct 3.3:** Long-term relationship between U.S. and PN **Construct 3.4:** Shared interests between U.S. and PN
CATEGORY 4. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY IN/BY THE PN SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government and public support the military
Construct 4.1: PN government invests in military **Construct 4.2:** PN public support for military
CATEGORY 5. ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF PN MILITARY SC is more likely to be successful when the PN military has sufficient capacity to absorb the SC being provided
Construct 5.1: PN military forces' absorptive capacity **Construct 5.2:** PN absorptive capacity—technical **Construct 5.3:** PN absorptive capacity—ministerial
CATEGORY 6. STRENGTH OF PN GOVERNMENT SC is more likely to be successful when the PN government has competent and strong institutions
Construct 6.1: PN government competence/strength
CATEGORY 7. PN GOVERNANCE SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that have good governments that are stable, not corrupt, and accountable to their people
Construct 7.1: PN democratic **Construct 7.2:** PN government stability **Construct 7.3:** PN government legitimacy **Construct 7.4:** PN governance **Construct 7.5:** Lack of PN government corruption **Construct 7.6:** PN human rights record
CATEGORY 8. PN ECONOMIC STRENGTH SC is more likely to be effective with PNs with stable economies and a minimum level of economic development
Construct 8.1: PN economy
CATEGORY 9. PN SECURITY SITUATION SC is more likely to be successful in PNs without internal stability or other serious threats (though these may increase their need for SC)
Construct 9.1: PN security
CATEGORY 10. PRACTICAL EASE OF ENGAGING WITH PN SC is more likely to be successful with PNs that are easier to work with because they are small, speak English, have good infrastructure, and have signed all necessary agreements with the U.S.
Construct 10.1: U.S.-PN agreements—information sharing Construct 10.2: U.S.-PN agreements—legal status of forces Construct 10.3: U.S.-PN common language Construct 10.4: PN transportation infrastructure Construct 10.5: PN communication infrastructure

Table 2. Tool Categories and Constructs, from Paul et al., 2013, 14–15.

In populating the tool with data, a system of measures or proxies was developed; each of the 27 constructs is represented by one or more measures or proxies.[94] For example, Construct 4.1, "PN government invests in military" is represented by multiple measures: a combination of total PN military spending per capita and total military budget as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).[95] Each measure comes from an accessible database with global or nearly global coverage.[96] The researchers used a variety of sources, including the Word Bank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations, Center for Systemic Peace, Gallup, and Jane's, as well as U.S. government agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security.[97]

The system developed to weigh the measures as a proxy for the construct included a weighted system, performed by the analyst, to approximate how reliable and valid the data sources are, and how closely the measure mirrored the construct.[98] For example, the absorptive capacity of a country's military, while very important, is also very hard to measure.[99] The research team therefore used a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 would be assigned to a measure that perfectly represented the construct and 0 would indicate no representation whatsoever. Interestingly, for absorptive capacity of the PNs military, the RAND team did not find any measures above 0.4.[100]

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94 Ibid., 17.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., 18.

The report calculated constructs weights based on five factors: (1) the overall proxy weight of the measures (the RAND team assessment of how well the measures represent the construct), (2) the strength of the correlation between the construct and the effectiveness of security cooperation, (3) the quality of the research supporting the construct, (4) the number of research studies supporting the construct, and (5) the extent to which the construct is duplicative or overlaps with other constructs.[101] The second and third factors came out of the initial literature review, the fourth was recorded during the hypothesis-sifting process, and the first and fifth are based on the RAND team's holistic assessment.[102] The construct scores and weights are combined to provide the overall propensity score for each country as well as the individual category scores.[103] Of note, the categories themselves have no inherent weight and are just a means of displaying similar constructs in a manageable format.[104] Figure 8 is a screenshot of the "Top Sheet" spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel.

The "Top Sheet" spreadsheet lists the 195 countries recognized by the U.S Department of State. These countries can be sorted using six different filters: country, CCMD, overall score, priority, SC/SFA/BPC expenditures, and SC/SFA/BPC expenditures by PN troop. These categories help the user compare individual countries as well as the overall CCMD's. In addition to these filters, the user can also sort the countries by any of the ten factors discussed in the previous chapter.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid., 18–19.

[104] Ibid., 19.

The workbook also contains sheets with explanations of the data tables, the source, and calculation data. The last sheet, “Category Construct Weights” provides defaults weights for the categories and constructs as determined by the authors however, the user can choose to input new weights to meet their criteria. At the bottom of the sheet each of the ten categories are assigned a normalized weight that sum to 1. Therefore, each normalized category weight represents its percentage of the “overall summary propensity score.”



Sort by

Country	▲ ▼	Category #1	▲ ▼
COCOM	▲ ▼	Category #2	▲ ▼
Overall Score	▲ ▼	Category #3	▲ ▼
Priority	▲ ▼	Category #4	▲ ▼
SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures	▲ ▼	Category #5	▲ ▼
SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures by PN Troop	▲ ▼	Category #6	▲ ▼
		Category #7	▲ ▼
		Category #8	▲ ▼
		Category #9	▲ ▼
		Category #10	▲ ▼

#	Country or Territory	ISO	FIPS	COCOM	Overall: OVERALL SUMMARY PROPENSITY SCORE Weighted average of CAT 1–CAT 10	Priority: PRIORITY/PRIORITY RANK	$$$: TOTAL SC/SFA/BPC EXPENDITURES FY10 US Expenditures ($M) for security cooperation with PN	$$$: TOTAL SC/SFA/BPC EXPENDITURES PER PN TROOP
1	Afghanistan	AFG	AF	CENTCOM	0.36	X	10,265.4	22,603
2	Albania	ALB	AL	EUCOM	0.56	X	5.1	353
3	Algeria	DZA	AG	AFRICOM	0.45	X	1.0	3
4	Andorra	ADO	AN	EUCOM	0.75	X	0.0	
5	Angola	AGO	AO	AFRICOM	0.43	X	0.4	3
6	Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	AC	SOUTHCOM	0.56	X	0.4	12,941
7	Argentina	ARG	AR	SOUTHCOM	0.52	X	0.7	14
8	Armenia	ARM	AM	EUCOM	0.50	X	3.4	65
9	Australia	AUS	AS	PACOM	0.84	X	0.0	0
10	Austria	AUT	AU	EUCOM	0.78	X	0.0	
11	Azerbaijan	AZE	AJ	EUCOM	0.46	X	3.9	50
12	Bahamas	BHS	BF	NORTHCOM	0.67	X	5.2	8,140
13	Bahrain	BHR	BA	CENTCOM	0.52	X	15.9	1,033
14	Bangladesh	BGD	BG	PACOM	0.35	X	4.0	12
15	Barbados	BRB	BB	SOUTHCOM	0.74	X	0.5	1,148
16	Belarus	BLR	BO	EUCOM	0.38	X	0.0	
17	Belgium	BEL	BE	EUCOM	0.73	X	0.0	0
18	Belize	BLZ	BH	SOUTHCOM	0.41	X	13.5	5,048
19	Benin	BEN	BN	AFRICOM	0.37	X	0.6	41
20	Bhutan	BTN	BT	PACOM	0.46	X	0.0	

#	Country or Territory	CAT 1: HISTORICAL QUALITY OF US SC/SFA/BPC PROVISION	CAT2: HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD OF SUCCESS WITH PN	CAT 3: US-PN RELATIONSHIP	CAT 4: SUPPORT FOR MILITARY IN/BY THE PN	CAT 5: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF PN MILITARY	CAT 6: STRENGTH OF PN GOVERNMENT	CAT 7: PN GOVERNANCE	CAT 8: PN ECONOMIC STRENGTH	CAT 9: PN SECURITY SITUATION	CAT 10: PRACTICAL EASE OF ENGAGING WITH PN
1	Afghanistan	0.76	0.08	0.32	0.70	0.22	0.11	0.23	0.20	0.23	0.16
2	Albania	0.39	0.57	0.68	0.44	0.58	0.52	0.65	0.61	0.69	0.40
3	Algeria	0.51	0.79	0.22	0.78	0.52	0.27	0.26	0.45	0.49	0.22
4	Andorra			0.67		0.89	0.90	0.74	0.68	0.94	0.47
5	Angola	0.60	0.59	0.42	0.77	0.39	0.19	0.32	0.16	0.47	0.16
6	Antigua and Barbuda	0.15	0.59	0.54		0.55	0.74	0.72	0.70	0.67	0.79
7	Argentina	0.42	0.78	0.57	0.25	0.66	0.42	0.63	0.62	0.65	0.43
8	Armenia	0.50	0.69	0.30	0.67	0.46	0.55	0.49	0.52	0.42	0.42
9	Australia			0.80	0.71	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.89	0.88	0.75
10	Austria			0.71	0.37	0.91	0.92	0.95	0.88	0.94	0.65
11	Azerbaijan	0.65	0.48	0.34	0.73	0.37	0.29	0.19	0.62	0.36	0.48
12	Bahamas	0.47	0.63	0.64		0.62	0.76	0.83	0.78	0.71	0.72
13	Bahrain	0.37	0.50	0.36	0.69	0.51	0.74	0.45	0.73	0.61	0.57
14	Bangladesh	0.36	0.46	0.44	0.36	0.32	0.26	0.37	0.28	0.43	0.16
15	Barbados	1.00	0.68	0.57		0.64	0.83	0.88	0.74	0.72	0.77
16	Belarus		0.92	0.21	0.43	0.36	0.20	0.29	0.75	0.48	0.51
17	Belgium			0.67	0.42	0.83	0.90	0.72	0.86	0.93	0.67
18	Belize	0.44	0.52	0.42	0.23	0.52	0.41	0.46	0.39	0.39	0.50
19	Benin	0.20	0.32	0.53	0.23	0.52	0.38	0.55	0.23	0.46	0.18
20	Bhutan		0.33	0.40		0.47	0.56	0.55	0.40	0.59	0.23

Strategic/Policy Considerations

#	Country or Territory	Largest allied contributor of foreign aid	Percentage of total arms shipments that is from China or Russia	Efficacy of security forces (1=low, 2=medium, 3=high)	PN on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism	NBC weapons proliferator	PN size index (population)
1	Afghanistan	USA	14	1	0	0	0.77
2	Albania	ITA	0	2	0	0	0.35
3	Algeria	FRA	85	2	0	0	0.77
4	Andorra		0	3	0	0	0.10
5	Angola	USA	0	2	0	0	0.70
6	Antigua and Barbuda	JPN	0	2	0	0	0.11
7	Argentina	JPN	50	2	0	0	0.78
8	Armenia	USA	47	2	0	0	0.35
9	Australia		0	3	0	0	0.74
10	Austria		0	3	0	0	0.53
11	Azerbaijan	USA	80	2	0	0	0.54
12	Bahamas		0	2	0	0	0.17
13	Bahrain		0	2	0	0	0.23
14	Bangladesh	GBR	66	2	0	0	0.86
15	Barbados	JPN	0	2	0	0	0.16
16	Belarus	USA	50	2	0	0	0.55
17	Belgium		0	3	0	0	0.58
18	Belize	JPN	0	2	0	0	0.17
19	Benin	USA	0	2	0	0	0.54
20	Bhutan	JPN	0	2	0	0	0.21

Figure 8. Screenshot of “Top Sheet” Spreadsheet, from The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.

In conclusion, the two reports have provided an analytical approach to building best practices when it comes to security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity. The first report, “What Works Best…” laid the groundwork through rigorous analysis of case studies to determine the conditions required for successful capacity building efforts while the second report, “The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization…Tool” took the conclusions from the first report and applied them to countries around the world.

In the following chapter, these reports will serve as a tool to gauge SOF efforts to build capacity as part of the various CCMD’s theater campaign plans. It will look at the current efforts by the Theater Special Operations Commands and measure the likelihood for success using the metrics from the RAND reports.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned the RAND Corporation to develop the Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool as a "diagnostic tool…that will help DOD decision makers preliminarily identify mismatches between the importance of a country to U.S. interests, U.S. security cooperation funding to that country, and the propensity for successful U.S. security cooperation with that country."[105] Furthermore, the tool aims to be "a preliminary diagnostic device that has the virtues of being systematic, being based on global data, and not relying on objective assessment."[106] These goals suggest that this tool could serve a valuable role in selecting appropriate partner nations with which to build capacity and improve U.S. foreign policy and national security.

However, the authors of the tool do advise that it comes with limitations; it is not a substitute for strategic thought and its designed purpose is to highlight any potential mismatches that may exist so that they can be further studied.[107] This observation is particularly relevant when considering countries that may be of high priority for national security, but do not score high on the criteria that the RAND tool believes will facilitate the building of partnership capacity.

Chapter II illustrated the complex system that makes up the security cooperation environment in which the National Security Council advises the President and coordinates policy. Due to several factors—low signature, cheaper cost, language and cultural capability—Special Operation Forces tend to be a part of the overall means by which security cooperation policy objectives are achieved. Recent history provides several examples such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines where SOF were called upon to build partner

[105] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), x.

[106] Ibid., p. xii.

[107] Ibid.

nation capacity. As discussed, the definition of special operations are operations characterized as containing one or more of the following: "time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk."[108] While many capacity building efforts may not require the employ of special operation forces, recent history provides several examples such as Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines where SOF were called upon to build partner nation capacity.

This chapter examines several areas where the findings and recommendations from the RAND report and the associated "matching tool" could be applicable to better match SOF efforts with building partnership capacity. The first part of the chapter contains general observations and trends from the data and how they relate to the employment of SOF around the globe. The second part of the chapter looks at implications for theater campaign planning at the Combatant Command (CCMD) and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOCs) where SOF would be considered a part of a capacity building effort.

A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND TRENDS

Observation #1

The first and most compelling observation from the "matching tool" is that the countries with the greatest propensity for successful capacity building are ones that do not pose dire security concerns to the United States. Conversely, there is a considerable correlation between low overall scores for successful capacity building and countries that present a security challenge for the United States and need capacity building in their security forces.

The majority of countries that the RAND tool identifies as having the greatest propensity for success fall within the EUCOM area of responsibility. They are developed democracies with good governance indicators and stable

[108] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *JP3–05: Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2011), GL-12.

economies. Many of these countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, are also members of NATO and have contributed to efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[109]

These results suggest that the greatest propensity for success in building partner capacity would be countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all of which are allies of the U.S. The current debate over capacity building does not generally include these countries, but rather countries that are considered failed states or lack the capacity to provide certain security functions, mainly counterterrorism, within their country. Most of the security cooperation efforts with the higher scoring countries involve building interoperability, usually through bilateral or combined exercises, exchanges, and information sharing.[110]

Observation #2

In 13 of the top 20 countries receiving U.S. SC/SFA/BPC expenditures (see Table 3), SOF contributed to the effort. This corroborates previous historical observations indicating that SOF units are often employed as part of larger SC/SFA/BC efforts. Some of the more recent and most notable examples include SOF's continuous presence in Afghanistan since 2001 while working with the Afghan Security Forces to build their special operations capabilities, SOF operations with Iraq special operations units during Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOF's work with the Colombian military to develop their special operations capabilities against the FARC, and SOF operations in the Philippines to assist the Philippine military in combating Islamic terrorist groups.

[109] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

[110] Department of State. "Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2012–2013." http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2013/index.htm.

Rank	Country	Total SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures (U.S. $M)
1	Afghanistan	$10,265.4
2	Israel	$2,995.1
3	Egypt	$1,298.7
4	Iraq	$963.7
5	Pakistan	$673.2
6	Jordan	$319.2
7	Colombia	$160.0
8	Mexico	$93.7
9	Lebanon	$79.6
10	Somalia	$75.3
11	South Sudan	$42.6
12	Russia	$41.6
13	Poland	$36.0
14	Philippines	$26.3
15	Indonesia	$23.3
16	Democratic Republic of the Congo	$22.0
17	Yemen	$21.1
18	Guatemala	$20.0
19	Tunesia	$19.1
20	Georgia	$18.0

Table 3. FY10 Total SC/SFA/BPC Expenditures from The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.

Policy makers may choose to employ SOF in capacity-building missions for a variety of reasons; however, it is often the case that they are better suited for the mission due to their smaller footprint and unique capabilities and experience in areas such as language capability, area and cultural orientation, and ability to work with indigenous populations. While expenditure figures do not account for all the nuanced variables that go into policy decision, it is interesting to note that the top twenty countries accounted in Fiscal Year 2010 for $17.1B of the $17.5B in SC/SFA/BC expenditure, with Afghanistan receiving the overwhelming majority at $10.2B[111].

[111] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

Observation #3

There is a strong correlation between the absorptive capacity of the military and the overall score presented in the RAND tool, which also includes political and economic factors. While not exclusive, the general trend indicates the higher the absorptive capacity of the partner nation military, the higher the propensity for successful capacity building.

In reviewing the RAND tool's ten categories, six (categories 4–9) are directly tied to the partner nation's military, population, and government. When considering the four elements of national power—Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic—building military capacity alone, including SOF capacity, as a means of influencing a partner nation's population and government could be challenging.

Category 9, "partner nation security situation," would be a more manageable military effort for SOF; however this variable most likely will require prolonged efforts, such as counterinsurgency or foreign internal defense, and necessitate large-scale mobilization. These efforts may also require the deployment of international peace keeping or counter-insurgency forces in order to improve the partner nation's security, which is costly, time consuming and may not be in line with the administration's national security strategy. A good example of this is the 2011 overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya; with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration was reluctant to put more ground troops into a situation that may require another sustained effort to stabilize the security situation. Instead, the U.S. elected to provide air support and partner with NATO allies in assisting opposition forces in removing the dictator and eventually electing the National Transitional Council.[112]

[112] Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO' Victory in Libya," *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya.

The tenth category, “practical ease of engaging with the partner nation,” is based on several factors such as legal agreements and infrastructure that generally fall under the purview of the Department of State or other agencies, and are not typically considered part of the DOD mission or military objectives. Moreover, the RAND tool prioritizes this as the second least weighted category within its overall score at only 3%. Therefore, although it may be easier to build capacity with countries that have a common language or have standing legal agreements with the U.S., this should not be a heavily weighted factor for SOF when choosing partners.

In Category 5, the last remaining category, “partner nation absorptive capacity” may be the most recognizable and measureable factor for SOF when planning security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity. Category 5 is based on the finding that “security cooperation works best when the military has the sufficient capacity to absorb the security cooperation being provided.”[113] However, the authors of the RAND matching tool are quick to note that this category should not be taken as an independent variable and should not be used as the sole means for determining success. Independent assessment of individual units and capabilities by knowledgeable personnel in addition to coordination with interagency and security cooperation organizations are critical to determining the true absorptive capacity of the partner nation’s military.

The authors of the RAND matching tool decided to weigh category 5 as the fourth highest; they assessed it as 15% of the overall summary propensity score, with categories 1,3, and 4 just slightly higher at 16%.[114] The authors determined the overall score for the partner nation’s military absorptive capacity by creating three constructs: 1. Partner nation’s military absorptive capacity, 2. Partner nation’s absorptive capacity—technical, and 3. Partner nation’s

[113] Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), xvii.

[114] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

absorptive capacity—ministerial.[115] Table 4 contains the list of the constructs, measures, and sources that make up the score for category 5. Future users of the RAND tool may choose to develop different constructs or weights to analyze different factors applicable to more specific missions.

Construct	Measure	Source
5.1 PN military forces' absorptive capacity		
Category 5 weight: 58%	5.1.1 PN military sophistication (EIU)	Military Capability and Sophistication Indicator (2007–2012) Global Peace Index (GPI), Institute for Economics and Peace, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, Sydney, Australia
	5.1.2 PN military spending in millions constant U.S. $ per troop	SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, World Bank Development Indicator, Total Armed Services Personnel
	5.1.3 Efficacy of security forces	IHS, Jane's Country Risk Intelligence Centere Module
5.2 PN absorptive capacity—technical		
Category 5 weight: 7%	5.2.1 U.S. patents granted annually to PN residents per capita	U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Number of Patents Granted as Distributed by Year of Patent Grant, PART A1, Table A1–1a, Breakout by U.S. State and Country of Origin, Number of Patents Granted as Distributed by Year of Patent Grant. Granted: 01/01/1963–12/31/2011
	5.2.2 Royalty and license fees/payments per GDP	World Bank, World Development Indicators; original source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files
	5.2.3 Secondary enrollment ratio	World Bank, World Development Indicators; original source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics
	5.2.4 Adult literacy rate	World Bank, World Development Indicators; original source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics
	5.2.5 Tertiary enrollment ratio	World Bank, World Development Indicators; original source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics
5.3 PN absorptive capacity—ministerial		
Category 5 weight: 35%	5.3.1 WGI Government Effectiveness rating	World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
	5.3.2 GDP per capita growth, average over past 5 years	World Bank World Development Indicators, derived from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files
	5.3.3 State control of security forces	IHS, Jane's Country Risk Intelligence Centre Module, December 2011
	5.3.4 Professionalism of security forces	IHS, Jane's Country Risk Intelligence Centre Module, December 2011

Table 4. Data for Category 5: Absorptive Capacity of PN Military, from The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.

[115] Ibid.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR CCMDS AND TSOCS

Chapter II illustrated how national security policy directs the combatant commands' efforts in theater campaign planning and security cooperation. The RAND matching tool provides some interesting insights and implications for the employment of SOF within certain geographic areas and CCMDs countries.

The RAND tool uses the State Department list of 195 recognized countries; the overall scores for countries varied between a low of .12 for Somalia and a high of .87 for the United Kingdom. A mean overall score was .51 and the COCOMs scored the following: USAFRICOM .38, USCENTCOM .43, USSOUTHCOM .50, USPACOM .51, USEUCOM .66, and USNORTHCOM .69.[116]

Dividing the overall scores into four tiers based on the mean scores, the top tier scores range from .88 to .57, the second tier between .56 and .39, the third tier between .38 and .20, and the final tier below .19 (see Table 5). The distribution of countries across the fours tiers is as follows: Tier 1 (highest score): 70, Tier 2: 73, Tier 3: 51, and Tier 4: 2.[117] 73 percent of the countries fell within the top two tiers and received an overall score of .39 or better, which suggests that in, a majority of countries, capacity building may be a viable effort if properly executed.

[116] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

[117] Ibid.

#	Country or Territory	ISO	FIPS	COCOM	SCORE
187	United States	USA	U.S.	NORTHCOM	0.88
186	United Kingdom (Britain)	GBR	UK	EUCOM	0.87
9	Australia	AUS	AS	PACOM	0.84
31	Canada	CAN	CA	NORTHCOM	0.84
47	Denmark	DNK	DA	EUCOM	0.83
100	Liechtenstein	LIE	LS	EUCOM	0.82
59	Finland	FIN	FI	EUCOM	0.80
129	Norway	NOR	NO	EUCOM	0.78
125	New Zealand	NZL	NZ	PACOM	0.78
10	Austria	AUT	AU	EUCOM	0.78
124	Netherlands	NLD	NL	EUCOM	0.78
81	Israel	ISR	IS	EUCOM	0.78
80	Ireland	IRL	EI	EUCOM	0.77
168	Sweden	SWE	SW	EUCOM	0.77
64	Germany	DEU	GM	EUCOM	0.77
60	France	FRA	FR	EUCOM	0.76
4	Andorra	ADO	AN	EUCOM	0.75
84	Japan	JPN	JA	PACOM	0.75
90	Korea (Seoul). Republic of Korea	KOR	KS	PACOM	0.75
15	Barbados	BRB	BB	SOUTHCOM	0.74
116	Monaco	MCO	MN	EUCOM	0.74
169	Switzerland	CHE	SZ	EUCOM	0.74
17	Belgium	BEL	BE	EUCOM	0.73
102	Luxembourg	LUX	LU	EUCOM	0.72
149	San Marino	SMR	SM	EUCOM	0.72
156	Singapore	SGP	SN	PACOM	0.72
139	Poland	POL	PL	EUCOM	0.72
158	Slovenia	SVN	SI	EUCOM	0.70
35	Chile	CHL	CI	SOUTHCOM	0.70
140	Portugal	PRT	PO	EUCOM	0.70
163	Spain	ESP	SP	EUCOM	0.70
109	Malta	MLT	MT	EUCOM	0.70
157	Slovakia (Slovak Republic)	SVK	LO	EUCOM	0.69
171	Taiwan	0	TW	PACOM	0.69
56	Estonia	EST	EN	EUCOM	0.69
43	Croatia	HRV	HR	EUCOM	0.69
66	Greece	GRC	GR	EUCOM	0.69
46	Czech Republic	CZE	EZ	EUCOM	0.68
82	Italy	ITA	IT	EUCOM	0.68
45	Cyprus	CYP	CY	EUCOM	0.68
74	Hungary	HUN	HU	EUCOM	0.67
12	Bahamas	BHS	BF	NORTHCOM	0.67
75	Iceland	ISL	IC	EUCOM	0.67
148	Samoa	WSM	WS	PACOM	0.67
185	United Arab Emirates	ARE	AE	CENTCOM	0.66
118	Montenegro	MNE	MJ	EUCOM	0.66
132	Palau	PLW	PS	PACOM	0.65
188	Uruguay	URY	UY	SOUTHCOM	0.65
147	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT	VC	SOUTHCOM	0.65
101	Lithuania	LTU	LH	EUCOM	0.65
110	Marshall Islands	MHL	RM	PACOM	0.65
146	Saint Lucia	LCA	ST	SOUTHCOM	0.62
95	Latvia	LVA	LG	EUCOM	0.62
145	Saint Kitts and Nevis	KNA	SC	SOUTHCOM	0.62
142	Romania	ROM	RO	EUCOM	0.62
178	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	TD	SOUTHCOM	0.60
114	Micronesia	FSM	FM	PACOM	0.60
26	Bulgaria	BGR	BU	EUCOM	0.60
141	Qatar	QAT	QA	CENTCOM	0.60
180	Turkey	TUR	TU	EUCOM	0.59
153	Serbia (Republic of Serbia)	SRB	RI	EUCOM	0.59
23	Botswana	BWA	BC	AFRICOM	0.59
106	Malaysia	MYS	MY	PACOM	0.59
25	Brunei (Brunei Darussalam)	BRN	BX	PACOM	0.58
92	Kuwait	KWT	KU	CENTCOM	0.58
37	Colombia	COL	CO	SOUTHCOM	0.57
24	Brazil	BRA	BR	SOUTHCOM	0.57
85	Jordan	JOR	JO	CENTCOM	0.57
161	South Africa	ZAF	SF	AFRICOM	0.57
41	Costa Rica	CRI	CS	SOUTHCOM	0.57
112	Mauritius	MUS	MP	AFRICOM	0.56
113	Mexico	MEX	MX	NORTHCOM	0.56
2	Albania	ALB	AL	EUCOM	0.56
130	Oman	OMN	MU	CENTCOM	0.56
6	Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	AC	SOUTHCOM	0.56
151	Saudi Arabia	SAU	SA	CENTCOM	0.56
67	Grenada	GRD	GJ	SOUTHCOM	0.55
63	Georgia	GEO	GG	EUCOM	0.55

#	Country or Territory	ISO	FIPS	COCOM	SCORE
154	Seychelles	SYC	SE	AFRICOM	0.55
122	Namibia	NAM	WA	AFRICOM	0.55
177	Tonga	TON	TN	PACOM	0.55
134	Panama	PAN	PM	SOUTHCOM	0.54
103	Macedonia, FYROM	MKD	MK	EUCOM	0.53
190	Vanuatu	VUT	NH	PACOM	0.52
13	Bahrain	BHR	BA	CENTCOM	0.52
83	Jamaica	JAM	JM	SOUTHCOM	0.52
119	Morocco	MAR	MO	AFRICOM	0.52
7	Argentina	ARG	AR	SOUTHCOM	0.52
143	Russia	RUS	RS	EUCOM	0.52
76	India	IND	IN	PACOM	0.52
36	China	CHN	CH	PACOM	0.52
49	Dominica	DMA	DO	SOUTHCOM	0.50
97	Lesotho	LSO	LT	AFRICOM	0.50
77	Indonesia	IDN	ID	PACOM	0.50
179	Tunisia	TUN	TS	AFRICOM	0.50
184	Ukraine	UKR	UP	EUCOM	0.50
192	Vietnam	VNM	VM	PACOM	0.50
8	Armenia	ARM	AM	EUCOM	0.50
58	Fiji	FJI	FJ	PACOM	0.49
174	Thailand	THA	TH	PACOM	0.49
65	Ghana	GHA	GH	AFRICOM	0.49
137	Peru	PER	PE	SOUTHCOM	0.48
138	Philippines	PHL	RP	PACOM	0.47
88	Kiribati	KIR	KR	PACOM	0.47
11	Azerbaijan	AZE	AJ	EUCOM	0.46
87	Kenya	KEN	KE	AFRICOM	0.46
71	Guyana	GUY	GY	SOUTHCOM	0.46
20	Bhutan	BTN	BT	PACOM	0.46
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	BK	EUCOM	0.46
73	Honduras	HND	HO	SOUTHCOM	0.46
166	Suriname	SUR	NS	SOUTHCOM	0.45
53	El Salvador	SLV	ES	SOUTHCOM	0.45
3	Algeria	DZA	AG	AFRICOM	0.45
32	Cape Verde	CPV	CV	AFRICOM	0.45
50	Dominican Republic	DOM	DR	SOUTHCOM	0.45
167	Swaziland	SWZ	WZ	AFRICOM	0.44
51	Ecuador	ECU	EC	SOUTHCOM	0.44
117	Mongolia	MNG	MG	PACOM	0.44
108	Mali	MLI	ML	AFRICOM	0.44
194	Zambia	ZMB	ZA	AFRICOM	0.43
86	Kazakhstan	KAZ	KZ	CENTCOM	0.43
173	Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania)	TZA	TZ	AFRICOM	0.43
96	Lebanon	LBN	LE	CENTCOM	0.43
5	Angola	AGO	AO	AFRICOM	0.43
135	Papua New Guinea	PNG	PP	PACOM	0.43
107	Maldives	MDV	MV	PACOM	0.43
164	Sri Lanka	LKA	CE	PACOM	0.42
52	Egypt	EGY	EG	CENTCOM	0.42
68	Guatemala	GTM	GT	SOUTHCOM	0.42
136	Paraguay	PRY	PA	SOUTHCOM	0.41
18	Belize	BLZ	BH	SOUTHCOM	0.41
27	Burkina Faso	BFA	UV	AFRICOM	0.41
115	Moldova (Republic of Moldova)	MDA	MD	EUCOM	0.41
61	Gabon	GAB	GB	AFRICOM	0.41
48	Djibouti	DJI	DJ	AFRICOM	0.41
79	Iraq	IRQ	IZ	CENTCOM	0.40
99	Libya	LBY	LY	AFRICOM	0.39
30	Cameroon	CMR	CM	AFRICOM	0.39
144	Rwanda	RWA	RW	AFRICOM	0.39
182	Tuvalu	TUV	TV	PACOM	0.39
131	Pakistan	PAK	PK	CENTCOM	0.39
29	Cambodia	KHM	CB	PACOM	0.39
152	Senegal	SEN	SG	AFRICOM	0.38
16	Belarus	BLR	BO	EUCOM	0.38
93	Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	KG	CENTCOM	0.38
183	Uganda	UGA	UG	AFRICOM	0.38
21	Bolivia	BOL	BL	SOUTHCOM	0.37
19	Benin	BEN	BN	AFRICOM	0.37
105	Malawi	MWI	MI	AFRICOM	0.37
98	Liberia	LBR	LI	AFRICOM	0.37
42	Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	CIV	IV	AFRICOM	0.37
162	South Sudan	SSD	OD	AFRICOM	0.37
159	Solomon Islands	SLB	BP	PACOM	0.37
28	Burundi	BDI	BY	AFRICOM	0.37
91	Kosovo	KSV	KV	EUCOM	0.37
175	Timor-Leste (East Timor)	TMP	TT	PACOM	0.36
189	Uzbekistan	UZB	UZ	CENTCOM	0.36
62	Gambia, The	GMB	GA	AFRICOM	0.36
1	Afghanistan	AFG	AF	CENTCOM	0.36

#	Country or Territory	ISO	FIPS	COCOM	SCORE
128	Nigeria	NGA	NI	AFRICOM	0.36
78	Iran	IRN	IR	CENTCOM	0.36
14	Bangladesh	BGD	BG	PACOM	0.35
126	Nicaragua	NIC	NU	SOUTHCOM	0.35
170	Syria (Syrian Arab Republic)	SYR	SY	CENTCOM	0.35
155	Sierra Leone	SLE	SL	AFRICOM	0.35
191	Venezuela	VEN	VE	SOUTHCOM	0.34
33	Central African Republic	CAF	CT	AFRICOM	0.34
44	Cuba	CUB	CU	SOUTHCOM	0.33
176	Togo	TGO	TO	AFRICOM	0.32
40	Congo (Kinshasa)/ Democratic Republic of the Congo	ZAR	CG	AFRICOM	0.32
123	Nepal	NPL	NP	PACOM	0.32
150	Sao Tome and Principe	STP	TP	AFRICOM	0.32
57	Ethiopia	ETH	ET	AFRICOM	0.30
39	Congo (Brazzaville)/ Republic of Congo	COG	CF	AFRICOM	0.30
120	Mozambique	MOZ	MZ	AFRICOM	0.30
193	Yemen	YEM	YM	CENTCOM	0.30
111	Mauritania	MRT	MR	AFRICOM	0.29
38	Comoros	COM	CN	AFRICOM	0.29
121	Myanmar (Burma)	MMR	BM	PACOM	0.29
94	Lao People's Democratic Republic	LAO	LA	PACOM	0.28
72	Haiti	HTI	HA	SOUTHCOM	0.27
172	Tajikistan	TJK	TI	CENTCOM	0.27
127	Niger	NER	NG	AFRICOM	0.27
70	Guinea-Bissau	GNB	PU	AFRICOM	0.27
34	Chad	TCD	CD	AFRICOM	0.26
104	Madagascar	MDG	MA	AFRICOM	0.26
181	Turkmenistan	TKM	TX	CENTCOM	0.25
54	Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	EK	AFRICOM	0.24
165	Sudan	SDN	SU	AFRICOM	0.24
195	Zimbabwe	ZWE	ZI	AFRICOM	0.24
133	Palestinian Authority (Palestinian Territories)	WBG	0	CENTCOM	0.23
69	Guinea	GIN	GV	AFRICOM	0.22
55	Eritrea	ERI	ER	AFRICOM	0.22
89	Korea (North), Democratic People's Republic of Korea	PRK	KN	PACOM	0.16
160	Somalia	SOM	SO	AFRICOM	0.12

Table 5. Countries by overall summary propensity score, after The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool.

As CCMD's and TSOC conduct theater campaign planning, current crises or emerging security situations may override the "matching tool" recommendations or ideal partner countries. For example, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined several regions of concern within Africa:

> The demand for U.S. forces to expand the counterterrorism capabilities of allied or partner forces will likely increase in the coming years. The United States will continue to advise, train, and equip partner forces to perform essential tasks against terrorist networks, complementing U.S. activities in the field. Operations and activities in the Maghreb, Sahel, and Horn of Africa, for example, further our national security interests without a large commitment of U.S. forces.[118]

[118] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: DOD, 2014), 37.

Of the 53 African nations within the area of responsibility of USAFRICOM, only six countries received a score greater than .51 on the "overall summary propensity score," with the mean being .38. USAFRICOM also contains the lowest scoring country, Somalia, with a score of just .12.[119] The low overall propensity for success in capacity building in Africa may create especially difficult situations for SOF units tasked with this mission, especially in high risk or challenging countries.

Within USAFRICOM, the countries that ranked highest in "absorptive capacity of the PN military" were Mauritius, a small island nation in the Indian Ocean; Cape Verde, another island nation on the western coast Africa; South Africa, Botswana, and Ghana.[120] Of these top countries, none falls within the regions of concern in the QDR. One of the countries that does fall within the QDR's region of concern, Algeria, is in the Maghreb; it was the highest-scoring country on "absorptive capacity" of its military of all the countries that fall within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and received an overall score of .45 despite a low rating of .22 in the U.S.- partnership relationship category. The .45 overall rating places Algeria in the second tier with other countries such as El Salvador, whose military received U.S. capacity-building efforts during a successful campaign against the FMLN in the 1980s with the assistance of U.S. Special Operations advisors. [121]

According to the RAND matching tool, Algeria is an ideal country for SOF engagement for several reasons. It is the largest country and has the second largest military in Africa, and it spends more on defense than any other African nation.[122] Algeria borders Mali and Libya, two countries fraught with violence and terrorist havens, yet in fiscal year 2010, the United States only spent $1 million in

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[119] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Alexander von Rosenbach ed., "Algeria" *Jane's Worlds Armies*, accessed 12 May 2014.

security cooperation expenditures on Algeria. In comparison, Somalia, the country with the absolute lowest score for building partner capacity, received $75.3 million in total security cooperation, security force assistance, and building partnership capacity expenditures, making it tenth overall in SC funding.[123]

This discrepancy in security cooperation expenditures can be linked to a variety of factors and reinforces the notion that national security interests may trump ideal pairing for partner capacity building. Furthermore, a country may have a greater absorptive capacity in its military, but this is not the only criterion for choosing partner nations.

As previously discussed, the debate over selecting countries for capacity building can be contentious and difficult; however, once a country is selected, the RAND reports make several recommendations that are applicable to SOF. The primary finding that contains overarching implications is that "matching matters"; however, one of the factors independent of PN context and wholly under the control of the United States relates to including a sustainment component to the initiative.[124] The sustainment component highlights the fact that most U.S. SOF units have significant tactical and operational skills useful for building partner capacity. This usually includes small units of PN SOF or security forces, but falls short when it comes to developing ministerial level capacity or sustainment components. In cases where SOF has been successful, additional assets were required to meet these other requirements. For example, in the case of Colombia, the United States provided a complete package of helicopters under Plan Colombia, including pilot training, technical advisors, mechanic training, logistics and parts, and so on.[125] This example illustrates that the U.S. SOF

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[123] Christopher Paul et al., *The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).

[124] Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 87–88.

[125] Department of State. "Aviation: Programs and Services." http://bogota.usembassy.gov/nas-aviation.html.

ability for building partnership capacity is dependent on a wider effort and other U.S. military and government partnerships.

In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed the data from the RAND reports and matching tool and provided several observations related to the employment of SOF in building capacity as well as the implication of the data from the matching tool and reports for CCMDs and TSOCs. The next chapter will provide several recommendations the employment of SOF in security cooperation missions.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis aimed to take the complex problem of selecting the best partner countries for building capacity and provide a useful tool and recommendations that would assist a TSOC or USSOCOM planner in developing security cooperation missions as part of a regional or theater campaign plan. The thesis used two reports on building partnership capacity by the RAND Corporation as a baseline to determine which factors are the most important, why, and under what circumstances would they be most effective.

The RAND reports provided several general findings and recommendations that are applicable to the wider DOD security cooperation community. However, this thesis specifically focused on the reports' applicability to SOF. Chapter IV, in particular, matched the RAND tool's recommendations for best regions and countries to partner with U.S. national security concerns, particularly those surrounding counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It found that the countries most ideal for partnering are the ones that need the least amount of capacity building. Conversely, the countries in need of the most capacity building are the ones that the RAND tool predicts are the least likely to succeed. This was particularly true in the African COCOM. In Algeria, where capacity, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency needs matched, the United States invested only $1 million in FY2010. Somalia, by contrast, received $75.3 million and is predicted to be the least likely to absorb capacity building, according to the RAND tool.

From these observations, this thesis concludes with the following recommendations for U.S. SOF efforts at building partnership capacity. First, the U.S. government should better develop authorizations, programs, and policies that lead to greater Department of State and Defense interoperability in matters related to security assistance and SOF security cooperation and capacity building. This coordination is particularly important for SOF because many of the Title 10 efforts to build partner capacity developed by the CCMDs or TSOCs

must meet Department of State approvals before they can be implemented. Therefore, greater coordination between these government agencies would smooth the process for initiating partnership and capacity building between U.S. SOF and various host nations.

Furthermore, the RAND tool suggests that building partnership capacity requires more than just building a country's military capabilities. It also requires building capacity in governance, economics and society. These tasks fall outside the purview of the DOD and require other U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State, Treasure, Justice, and U.S. AID. Better coordination between all of these U.S. entities would result in a more holistic approach to building partnership capacity.

This recommendation is the most idealistic, ambitious, and difficult to implement due to the many stakeholders involved in the process of security engagement, as outlined in Chapter II. However, it is also critical to implement. Current pilot programs like the Global Security Contingency Fund, allow DOS or DOD to provide assistance to countries designated by DOS as important, with concurrence by DOD.[126] The countries programmed to receive support in FY 2012 included Nigeria, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Libya, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. [127] Information on the outcome of these pilot countries is not yet available. Nonetheless, the programs appear to a positive step towards developing true interoperability between the departments; however, as defense funding continues to decrease, these initiatives will be at risk for cancellation.

The second recommendation is to synchronize security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity within TSOC campaign plans and leverage other DOD and interagency assets to fill in the gaps. In a fiscally austere environment each security cooperation mission must be carefully weighed and nested with the

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[126] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012*, HR 1540,112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, sec 1207.

[127] Nina M. Serafino, *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview*, CRS Report R42641 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2014), 8.

overarching theater and regional campaign plans. In addition, SOF may be required to perform certain portions of a capacity building effort due to mission requirements or constraints; however, TSOCs should look to leverage missing capabilities gaps within the TSOC and work closely with U.S. conventional forces and interagency partners to fill the gaps that SOF cannot address. For example, if a CCMD and TSOC agree to deploy a SOF unit to develop a counterterrorism capability in a particular country, the SOF unit is fully capable of developing and training a force at the tactical level; however, it lacks capabilities in developing supporting efforts like supply chain management for specialized equipment, or the procurement process for uniforms and equipment, or setting up Foreign Military Sales accounts to support the needs of the newly developed counterterrorism force. Therefore, SOF cannot build capacity alone. Not only does true capacity building require interagency cooperation; it also requires better integration between U.S. military forces and supporting units.

These observations lead to the third recommendation: USSOCOM, in coordination with the OSD and interagency, should conduct a joint capabilities assessment in line with the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF), and interoperability model to determine long-term solutions to security cooperation efforts and capacity building missions. This effort should specifically include how to employ SOF in early phases of assessing a partner country's capability and military absorptive capacity, as well as how to incorporate a sustainment piece that would match the capacity of a partner country's military and economy. Such an assessment could then be used to determine critical capability gaps within SOF and the seams between SOF and conventional forces capabilities, thus allowing for better unity of effort between SOF, conventional forces, and interagency in capacity building efforts.

One of the challenges associated with such an interagency effort is lack of clear lines of authority and the amount of decentralization in the system. USSOCOM is technically the lead agency for Security Force Assistance, but they are not a force provider like the military services, and do not have legal

responsibility for a geographically area like a Geographic Combatant Command. Additionally each service providing forces to the various CCMDs has different policies and procedures on how they organize, man, and equip their forces for security cooperation and building partner capacity missions.

The fourth recommendation involves the security cooperation organization and the embassy country team. USSOCOM and TSOCs should continue to review initiatives like the Special Operations Liaison Officer program that would allow a dedicated SOF officer to work with and advise the ambassador, chief of mission, defense attaché or military group commander on the unique capabilities and limitations that SOF units offer in regard to building partner capacity efforts. Currently the senior defense official within a given embassy or country team is typically not a SOF officer and does not have SOF experience. This lack of experience or understanding can lead to confusion and mistrust over what SOF units can accomplish, or how they fit into the larger regional or theater plans.

In order to correct this problem, embassies should include a SOF liaison on its staff. However, some of the challenges to this approach include a lack of authorized positions within the country team's table of distribution and allowances (TDA), lack of a defined career path for officers who perform these duties, and most importantly, the risk of overwhelming the interagency partners with too many military liaisons and creating an impression of attempting to become overly militaristic.

Recommendations for further research

Finally, this thesis concludes with suggestions for future research projects. The quantitative data from the RAND matching tool relies on open source data easily available to the common user. While this approach allows for greater access, it may have its limitations when observing SOF operations that may be classified. Future research could replace the pertinent data with up-to-date information from classified sources that may contain better fidelity and compare the outcome with the open source data.

Other research efforts could look at case studies where SOF units built capacity in the form of developing or supporting an insurgency to overthrow a regime and compare those findings with the findings and recommendations from the RAND reports.

These are just a few suggestions for what is likely to be a field of greater interest as the United States draws down its forces in Afghanistan and yet seeks to be engaged in the world in less costly and large scale operations. Building partnership capacity is one critical avenue for continued engagement.

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